Essay—Insurance Coverage for Environmental Clean-up Costs under Comprehensive General Liability Policies by Julian, Jim L. & Schlumberger, Charles L.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 1 Article 3 
1996 
Essay—Insurance Coverage for Environmental Clean-up Costs 
under Comprehensive General Liability Policies 
Jim L. Julian 
Charles L. Schlumberger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jim L. Julian and Charles L. Schlumberger, Essay—Insurance Coverage for Environmental Clean-up Costs 
under Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 57 (1996). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss1/3 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
ESSAY-INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL




Whether it be Times Beach, Missouri or a small spill at the comer
gasoline station, the issue of whether environmental clean-up costs are
covered by comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policies is a
source of continuing-and vigorous-litigation. Under today's federal and
state environmental laws, many companies and individuals are saddled with
staggering costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. This dramatic
financial burden has spawned massive litigation with insurance carriers
seeking coverage for these enormous expenses.
The purpose of this essay is to provide the reader with a history of the
development of CGL policies, the evolution of the so-called "pollution
exclusion" endorsement or clause, and a survey of developments in litigation
over coverage for environmental clean-up costs.' While this essay is geared
more to the Arkansas practitioner, the authors believe that much of its
content should be useful to attorneys in other jurisdictions who practice in
this field.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
Prior to 1940, most, if not all, insurance written in the United States
was provided on a "named perils" basis. In other words, the types of events
for which insurance coverage was provided were specifically enumerated in
the policy-fire or flood, for example. Beginning in the 1940s, insurance
companies departed from this practice by providing insurance coverage on
* Jim L. Julian is a partner in the law firm of Chisenhall, Nestrud & Julian, P.A., in
Little Rock, Arkansas where his practice involves litigation of civil matters, including toxic
tort actions, environmental contribution matters and insurance coverage disputes. He is a
graduate of Arkansas State University (B.A. 1976) and the University of Arkansas School
of Law (J.D. 1979).
** Charles L. Schlumberger is a partner in the law firm of Wright, Lindsey & Jennings
in Little Rock, Arkansas. He is a graduate of Cornell University (B.A. 1976) and Vanderbilt
Law School (J.D. 1979). His primary areas of practice include commercial litigation and
public utilities law.
1. The scope of this essay is limited to CGL insurance coverage for costs associated
with environmental clean-up and remediation ordered by a state or federal environmental
regulatory agency. Among topics not addressed are CGL or other insurance coverage for
private personal injury or property damage claims arising from, or associated with,
environmental contamination.
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an "all-risk" policy coverage form or on a CGL insurance form. Both types
of policies were designed to cover all potential perils to which an insured
may be subjected, without specific enumeration. The insurance carmers,
through endorsements to the policies, would exclude from coverage any
particular types of losses or events not covered under the policy. Originally,
policies written on an all-risk or CGL basis covered any pollution losses of
an insured provided that such losses were neither intentional, expected, nor
criminal in character. These policies were generally available from the
1940s through the early 1970s.
The emergence and evolution of "pollution exclusion" endorsements to
CGL policies coincide with the enactment and enforcement of federal and
state environmental laws. Prior to the 1960s, statutes governing environ-
mental pollution were relatively few and weak. For example, the scope and
effect of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act,3 which originated in
1948 and 1955, respectively, today are nowhere comparable to their original
missions. The revolutionary era of the 1960s spawned, among other things,
a heightened awareness of our environment and in particular the egregious
and often irreparable damage caused by pollution and contamination. From
this awareness came action, primarily through legislation that not only
strengthened the aforementioned statutes, but also established new laws,
such as the Solid Waste Disposal Act,4 which in its amended form is now
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),5 and the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). These federal statutes also were supplemented by state
statutes, and both federal and state regulatory bodies were created to enforce
these laws.
Stronger laws and greater enforcement necessarily meant more claims
under CGL policies. Hence, beginning in 1970, the insurance industry
introduced a series of pollution exclusions that were engrafted onto CGL
policies as endorsements. Through that decade and into the early 1980s, the
industry continually modified the pollution exclusion endorsements, moving
toward more limited coverage for pollution clean-up costs, both in terms of
scope of coverage and monetary limits. Ultimately, due to the extensive
amount of exposure relating to polluting events, the industry adopted the
"absolute" pollution exclusion in 1986, which is intended to totally eliminate
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3251 (1970) (effective 1965).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994) (effective 1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994) (effective 1980).
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coverage for pollution-related clean-up costs. It is rare that any CGL policy
written after 1986 does not contain an absolute pollution exclusion.7
Another historic development germane to the topic is the industry's
switch from occurrence CGL policies to "claims made" CGL policies. Prior
to the 1980s, most CGL policies were the former. Since then, virtually all
CGL policies take the latter form. As discussed later in this essay' this
distinction is critical to the prospects for recovering on a claim, as
establishing an earlier occurrence policy as the applicable policy is more
likely to result in coverage than under a later claims made policy.
As the historical perspective implies, claims for coverage against
policies issued between 1940 and 1970 have a significant likelihood for
success due to the absence of any type of exclusion for pollution losses.
After 1970, the battle becomes much more difficult for an insured due to the
inclusion of pollution exclusion endorsements.
However, in pursuing claims under older policies issued between the
1940s and the 1970s, the insured confronts two significant threshold
problems. The first, and obviously most troublesome, is whether the carrier
that issued the policy is still in existence. As with any other industry,
insurance companies come and go, as was dramatically demonstrated in the
latter 1970s and early 1980s when many financially troubled carriers were
forced into liquidation. While the closure of an insurance company is
carefully regulated through receivership in order to assure that as many
claims as possible are paid, nonetheless policyholders whose claims arise
after dissolution are simply out of luck. This scenario frequently arises in
the context of an environmental clean-up claim, where the polluting event
often manifests itself long after the carrier has closed its doors.
The second threshold hurdle confronting an insured in making a claim
under an earlier policy is to prove the existence of the policy, including the
specific terms and conditions in the policy. The insured carries the burden
of establishing both the existence and the terms of the policies under which
it seeks coverage, and hence it will confront an insurmountable burden if
neither it nor, through discovery, the insurer can produce the specific policy
documentation. This burden is particularly troublesome in claims based on
ancient policies, where routine document destruction already may have
occurred.
7. The insurance industry offers coverage for environmental clean-up costs through
environment impairment liability policies, which are distinguished from CGL policies.
However, the premiums for this type of coverage are substantial, making such coverage
feasible only for industries having significant potential for environmental clean-up claims.
This essay focuses on the more common CGL policy.
8. See infra part IIA-B.
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II. DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE POLICIES
Among the most important issues in a coverage dispute is determining
the comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policies that govern
the controversy. As with most insurance contracts, CGL policies are
renewed periodically, and thus policy language and endorsements can
change frequently. This is particularly true in the context of pollution
exclusion clauses and endorsements. As previously noted, earlier CGL
policies issued prior to the mid-i 970s either have no pollution exclusions at
all, or the exclusions are either partial or conditional, both in scope and
monetary limits, thereby providing greater opportunity for coverage.
However, as the enactment and enforcement of environmental laws grew,
and as the concomitant coverage claims grew, the insurance industry
responded with much tighter and restrictive pollution exclusion provisions,
ultimately coming to today's absolute pollution exclusion.
A. "Claims Made" and "Occurrence" Policies
Determining the applicable policy begins by ascertaining whether the
CGL policy is a claims made policy or an occurrence policy. Under a claims
made policy, the policy in effect at the time the insured posts its claim with
its carrier will control coverage. In contrast, under an occurrence policy, the
policy in effect at the time of the event giving rise to the claim will control,
regardless of the time at which the insured posts its claim with the carrier.
For example, assume that the insured has had CGL coverage from 1970
to present, with the policies renewed on an annual basis. Also assume that
the "event"--a discharge of hazardous substances-occurred in 1970, and
assume further that the event did not manifest itself until 1987, and hence
the insured did not become liable for clean-up costs until that time
(something that indeed happens in the real world). The insured then posts
its claim with its CGL carrier. If the insurance policies were occurrence
policies, then the policy in effect during 1970-when the event occurred-
would control. On the other hand, if the policies were claims made policies,
then the policy in effect in 1987-the time at which the claim was made--
controls.
This first step of determining the applicable policy can be critical to
evaluating the case for coverage. As previously noted, later policies
generally have much broader pollution exclusion provisions, and thus the
prospects for coverage become correspondingly less likely. Thus, under the
foregoing example, the insured most likely will have greater difficulty in
[Vol. 19
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achieving coverage under a 1987 claims made policy containing an absolute
pollution exclusion than under a 1970 occurrence policy that may have no
pollution exclusion at all.
B. Determining the Time of the "Occurrence"
To determine the applicable policy, one must establish the time(s) at
which the event(s) occurred. Again, from the insured's perspective, the
earlier the event occurred, the more likely that there will be either no
pollution exclusion or a comparatively weaker one. Accordingly, an insured
can expect its carrier to contest the time at which the event occurred. The
carrier will contend that the event occurred in later years, in an effort to
place the occurrence under a policy containing a broader pollution exclusion.
Establishing the time of an occurrence in an environmental case
certainly can be problematic. Assuming that the release of the hazardous
substance constitutes the occurrence, there are any number of situations
where (i) the moment of release, and (ii) whether there were a series of
releases over a number of years, becomes a factual issue for trial.
Moreover, a carrier may contend that the occurrence is not triggered by the
release, but by the time at which the insured incurs the environmental clean-
up costs, which often is much later than the time of the release.9
C. Umbrella Coverage
In the course of determining applicable policies, the insured also should
consider any umbrella policies that it may have. An umbrella policy well
could provide coverage, even where the primary CGL policy does not.
Customarily, umbrella policies are viewed by the insured merely as
providing additional monetary coverage over and above the limits of the
underlying CGL policy. This much certainly is true, but insureds often
overlook the second purpose of an umbrella policy-to provide coverage for
types of losses that otherwise are outside the scope of the underlying CGL
policy's coverage. If the umbrella policy does not include its own pollution
exclusion, then when viewed for its second purpose of providing coverage
not granted under the primary policy, a strong argument can be made that
the umbrella policy provides coverage for environmental clean-up costs.




Forum selection is of utmost importance in litigating a case turning on
coverage for an environmental claim, particularly for Arkansas insureds.
Currently, no Arkansas state court of last resort, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas or the Arkansas Court of Appeals, has issued any decisions
providing guidance on insurance coverage issues in the context of environ-
mental claims. Thus, both the insured and the carrier are testing uncharted
waters by litigating these issues in Arkansas state courts.
Beyond this, there is one issue, commonly known as the "as damages"
issue, that absolutely dictates the success or failure of an action seeking
CGL insurance policy coverage for environmental clean-up costs. While
other issues certainly must be considered in the course of selecting the
forum,'" the as damages issue will control the fate of the litigation at the
threshold.
A. "As Damages" and the Eighth Circuit's NEPACCO" Decision
The kernel of the as damages issue is the coverage language tradition-
ally used in CGL (as well as umbrella) policies, and the interpretation of
that language by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
and other courts.'2
This language, known as the as damages clause, was interpreted by the
Eighth Circuit in Continental Insurance Cos. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. 3 ("NEPACCO") to exclude coverage for
environmental claims.
14
For purposes of this discussion, the pertinent facts are that, as part of
the spate of litigation arising from the dioxin contamination problems that
beset Times Beach, Missouri, the CGL carrier for the prime responsible
party, NEPACCO, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determina-
tion whether NEPACCO's various (and substantial) liabilities were covered
10. See infra part IV.
11. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri v. Continental Ins. Co., 488 U.S.
821 (1988).
12. Virtually all CGL (and umbrella) policies contain some version of the following
coverage language: the Carrier will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums the Insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence.
13. 842 F.2d 977.
14. The factual.and procedural history of NEPACCO is complicated and reading the
entire case is recommended.
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under the various CGL policies issued by the carrier to NEPACCO.' 5
Among those potential liabilities was NEPACCO's liability to reimburse the
state and federal governments for environmental clean-up costs incurred by
those governments under RCRA and CERCLA' 6  The carrier posited
various theories in arguing that these claims were excluded from coverage,
but the argument that ultimately proved to be its savior was advanced by the
American Insurance Association ("AIA"), which appeared as amicus
curiae. 17
The AIA argued that the as damages language does not encompass
environmental clean-up costs, and the Eighth Circuit agreed. 8 The court,
sitting en banc, acknowledged that the interpretation of the policy language
was governed by applicable principles of Missouri law governing insurance
policy construction. 9
The Eighth Circuit then held that, while the "lay insured" may attach
a broader meaning to the term damages to encompass all monetary claims,
that term, as used in "the insurance context . . . is not ambiguous and...
refers to legal damages and does not include equitable monetary relief."2
From there, the majority concluded that actions by state and federal
governments to recover environmental clean-up costs were "essentially




15. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 981.
16. Id. at 980.
17. Id. at 983.
18. Id. at 984-85.
19. NEPACO, 842 F.2d at 985. The court stated:
[Tihe rules of construction applicable to insurance contracts require that the
language used be given its plain meaning. If the language is unambiguous the
policy must be enforced according to such language. If the language is ambiguous
it will be construed against the insurer. Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably
open to different constructions; and language used will be viewed in light of "the
meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the lay [person] who bought and
paid for the policy.
Id. (quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc)) (other citations omitted). The authors point out that these same principles are
recognized in Arkansas. E.g., Daniels v. Colonial Ins. Co., 314 Ark. 49, 857 S.W.2d 162
(1993) (ruling policies are to be interpreted in plain and ordinary sense); Countryside
Casualty Co. v. Grant, 269 Ark. 526, 601 S.W.2d 875 (1980) (construing ambiguities against
insurer). The principles also hold true in most, if not all, other states. See generally LEE R.
Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D, chs. 21, 22 (C.B.C. 1995).
20. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d
1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987)).
21. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 987.
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The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,22 and thus
NEPACCO is the controlling law in the Eighth Circuit, insofar as recovery
of environmental clean-up costs under a CGL policy is concerned. Two
other circuit courts of appeals have followed the NEPACCO rationale in
cases turning on laws of states within their circuits.23
Other courts have strongly disagreed with, and even openly criticized,
the NEPACCO decision, and those courts combine to represent the majority
24view. In Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 25 the District of Columbia Circuit, also applying Missouri law in a case
seeking coverage for environmental clean-up costs, flatly rejected
NEPACCO as a case that "ignores clear signals from the state courts" and
"clearly misreads state law. 26
B. Avoiding NEPACCO
In two subsequent decisions turning on Arkansas law, the Eighth
Circuit has applied its NEPACCO rationale to deny coverage, finding that
there was no controlling Arkansas law on the specific issue.27 Accordingly,
unless and until an Arkansas court of last resort renders a decision to the
contrary, NEPACCO will be applied by the federal courts in the Eighth
Circuit to deny coverage based on the CGL policy's as damages language.
Thus, an Arkansas insured must carefully evaluate its options in selecting
a forum that will not be governed by NEPACCO.
22. 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
23. A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991)
(applying Maine law); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988)
(applying South Carolina law); Snyder Gen. Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 907 F. Supp. 991
(N.D. Tex. 1995).
24. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir.
1991); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1991); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989); Hudson
Ins. Co. v. Double D Mgmt. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Intel Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Nat'l Indem. Co. v.
U.S. Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Village of Morrisville
Water & Light Dep't v. USF&G, 775 F. Supp. 718 (D. Vt. 1991).
25. 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 (1992).
26. Id. at 945. State courts also reject NEPACCO. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 WL 356056 (I11. 1992); A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1991); Hazen Paper Co. v. USF&G, 555
N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457
N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388
S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash.
1990).
27. Parker Solvents Co. v. Royal Ins. Cos., 950 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1991); Grisham v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Successfully maintaining an environmental coverage case in a state
court is problematic because the elements for federal diversity jurisdiction--
diverse citizenship of the parties and a dispute valued in excess of $50,000
---are usually present. One option for the plaintiff insured is to file an action
in its home state court that includes a resident defendant, thereby destroying
diversity jurisdiction. The insured, however, must have a legitimate,
colorable claim against the resident defendant. Otherwise, the law of
fraudulent joinder may be applied to effect the dismissal of the "straw"
defendant.
This strategy has been upheld in the face of a non-resident carrier's
filing of a separate declaratory judgment action in federal court. In United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,28 the carrier,
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("USF&G"), filed a declaratory
judgment action in Alabama seeking a ruling that it was not liable for
coverage on an environmental clean-up claim brought by its insured,
Murphy Oil.29 Murphy Oil then filed a state court action in Arkansas
against USF&G and other potentially liable insurers, including an Arkansas-
resident insurer.3"
After prevailing upon the Alabama federal court to transfer its case to
Arkansas, Murphy Oil then moved the Arkansas federal court to stay the
case on abstention grounds, relying on the pending Arkansas state court
action.31 The district court stayed the case on abstention grounds, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, applying the traditional abstention standards and
further noting that, in a declaratory judgment action, a federal district court's
jurisdiction is discretionary.32
One strategy that has been rejected involves splitting claims, in an
effort to bring one claim in state court that seeks less than the federal
jurisdictional amount. In Federated Rural Electric Insurance Corp. v.
Arkansas Electric Cooperatives, Inc.," the insured filed suit against its CGL
carrier in an Arkansas state court, narrowing its claim to one of several
years, and one of several CGL policies, that arguably applied. 4 The insured
also filed another action in a different Arkansas state court for claims
relating to the remaining years and policies.3" The carrier responded by
filing a declaratory judgment action encompassing all years and all policies,
28. 21 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 1994).
29. Id. at 260.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 263-64.
33. 48 F.3d 294 (8th Cir. 1995).




and also by removing the second suit on diversity grounds.36 The insured
persuaded the federal district court to stay its proceedings on abstention
grounds, relying on USF&G.37
On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with
instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the carrier, applying
NEPACCO.3s The Eighth Circuit, with a few choice words about forum-
shopping, distinguished USF&G, where all policies and all defendant
carriers were included in one state court action.39 In contrast, the insured's
splitting of its claims within the state courts would have resulted in
piecemeal litigation, a factor that militates against abstention. The panel
reasoned that because all claims were before the federal court, the carrier
should not be subjected to piecemeal litigation, nor should it be deprived of
federal court jurisdiction in order to consider all claims at one time.4
Absent the ability to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction, the only
alternative is to bring suit in a federal court outside the circuits that embrace
the NEPACCO rationale. If the carrier is a resident of a forum in which the
law is more favorable to the insured, or if the event giving rise to the claim
occurred in a more favorable forum, the litigation might be brought there.
However, beware of choice-of-law doctrines and motions to transfer. Just
as the insured desires to avoid forums that follow NEPACCO, the carrier
will be seeking ways to get to them.
C. The Prospects for an Arkansas Ruling
As previously stated, Arkansas state courts of last resort have yet to
rule on any case involving CGL carrier liability for an insured's
environmental clean-up costs. Two state trial courts have reached contrary
decisions on the as damages issue. In Grantors to the Diaz Refinery PRP
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 300-01.
39. Id. at 297-98. The court stated:
We need not decide whether Federated's choice of a federal forum is motivated
by forum-shopping (we suspect that it was), for it is sufficiently clear that AECI's
attempts to remain in state court were motivated by a desire to avoid NEPACCO.
Moreover, it appears that much of the progress that has been made in the state
actions has been due to the reactive tactics of AECI. In light of AECI's hands
which were soiled during its forum-shopping spree, we are disinclined to view its
request for abstention as anything more than a continuation of its forum selection
strategy.
Id. at 299.
40. Id. at 298-99.
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Committee Site Trust v. Ranger Insurance,4 the Jackson County Circuit
Court followed NEPACCO in denying coverage. It appears that the
Arkansas Supreme Court will never have an opportunity to decide the issue.
All of the defendant carriers except one settled; the lone remaining carrier
is subject to an Oklahoma receivership and an accompanying stay of
litigation that the Arkansas Supreme Court has decided to honor, applying
full faith and credit to Oklahoma's insurance and receivership laws.42
The Union County Circuit Court in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.43 rejected NEPACCO in ruling in favor of
the insured on the as damages language. In that case, the insured was
awarded a significant jury verdict." No one can accurately gauge whether
or when the Arkansas Court of Appeals might decide the case on the
merits.45
While it is always folly to attempt to predict any court's action on a
given issue, Arkansas Supreme Court precedent appears to support a ruling
in favor of the insured. In Home Indemnity Co. v. City of Marianna" the
court indicated that the term damages as used in a CGL policy will be
broadly interpreted in favor of coverage. 7 In Home Indemnity, the carrier
refused the tender of defense by its insured, a city that had been sued for
injunctive relief, costs and attorneys fees for alleged violation of the federal
Voting Rights Act.4 The city filed a declaratory judgment action, and the
lower court ruled in favor of the city, ordering the carrier to provide
defense.49
On appeal, the carrier argued that under the policy it was only required
to provide defense in cases where the city was exposed to damages, and
because the complaint did not seek damages it was under no duty to
defend." The court affirmed, holding that because damages can be awarded
41. 319 Ark. 235, 890 S.W.2d 259 (1995) (per curiarn) (order staying proceedings until
the parties are free to proceed and intend to do so).
42. Id.
43. Appeal docketed, No. CA96-843 (Ark. Ct. App. July 19, 1996).
44. Id.
45. Murphy Oil USA v. USF&G., appeal docketed, No. CA96-843 (Ark. Ct. App. July
19, 1996). This case is presently in active briefing with the appellant's brief due September
27, 1996.
46. 291 Ark. 610, 727 S.W.2d 375 (1987).
47. Id. at 616-17, 727 S.W.2d at 378.
48. Id. at 611-12, 727 S.W.2d at 375-76. The Voting Rights Act is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (1996).
49. Home Indem., 219 Ark. at 612, 727 S.W.2d at 376.
50. Id. at 612-13, 727 S.W.2d at 376. The city only asked for injunctive relief, costs,
and fees. Id. at 612, 727 S.W.2d at 376.
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under the Voting Rights Act, 5' the duty to defend arose, even though the
complaint did not specifically seek damages. 2 In the course of this ruling,
the Court also offered its observations on the construction of the phrase
"damages" as used in the policy.53 These remarks indicate that the Arkansas
Supreme Court will accord a broader meaning to the term damages than that
recognized in legal parlance. Additionally, the court's observations hint that
the word damages may be clouded with ambiguity in the absence of
defining language. CGL policies commonly do not define that term.
In addition to the implications of Home Indemnity, the Arkansas
General Assembly's 1989 amendment to the Remedial Action Trust Fund
ActM ("RATFA") demonstrates legislative intent that environmental clean-up
costs are "legal damages" under Arkansas law." This statute plainly
classifies environmental clean-up costs as damages and thus provides
legislative guidance to the Court-if and when it meets the issue.56
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
52. Home Indem., 291 Ark. at 619, 727 S.W.2d at 379-80.
53. Id. at 613, 727 S.W.2d at 376. The court stated:
We do not agree that issues basic to insurance coverage can properly turn on what
"ordinarily" pertains. Certainly the coverage itself was never intended to stand or
fall on the terms which are subject to differing interpretation. Moreover, we find
some elasticity in the word "damages."... Furthermore, Home could easily have
eliminated the uncertainty by defining "damages" in its policy. It chose not to do
so and we are unwilling to deny coverage on that equivocal ground.
Id. at 613, 727 S.W.2d 376-77 (citations omitted).
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-501 (Michie 1993).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-501(c), as follows:
(c) A further purpose of this subchapter is to clarify the General Assembly's intent
to provide the department with the necessary funds for remedial action at a
hazardous substance site, recognizing that both public and private funds must be
expended to implement remedial action at the hazardous substance sites which
exist in this state. Costs and expenses for remedial action, whether expended by
the department or by any person liable for the hazardous substance site are legal
damages to persons liable to the state and to persons liable to any other person
for contribution, whether such liability arises by voluntary compliance with this
subchapter pursuant to an order from or settlement with the department, or by suit
for injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, contribution, damages or restitution,
and whether such suit is brought by the state or by any party authorized to bring
a suit for relief under this subchapter.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-502(c) (emphasis added).
56. It should be noted that in Grisham and Parker Solvents, the Eighth Circuit declined
to interpret Home Indem. and the RATFA amendment to provide coverage. Thus, an
Arkansas state court of last resort must rule on these issues as well.
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D. Other Forum Selection Considerations
Aside from the as damages clause, there are other terms within the
comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policy and the pollution
exclusion endorsements that have been subject to varying interpretations by
federal and state courts across the country." Thus, those terms and the
courts' interpretations of them also should be considered in determining
forum selection. However, unlike the as damages clause, the interpretation
of these other terms often is governed by the particular factual circum-
stances. Accordingly, a decision from a particular forum that facially may
seem either adverse or supportive might be distinguishable on the facts, and
hence caution must be employed in either selecting or rejecting that forum.
IV. THE TERMS OF THE POLICIES AND ENDORSEMENTS
Generally, the carrier's primary defenses will turn on language
contained in the CGL policies and pollution exclusion endorsements. The
insurer may raise other defenses common to coverage disputes, such as
failure to cooperate, failure to disclose facts material to coverage and risk,
failure to give timely notice, as well as traditional defenses based on waiver,
estoppel, or statutes of limitations. The focus of this essay is limited to the
policy and endorsement language that is central to the environmental
coverage claim.
A. General Policy Provisions
As with other types of insurance policies, CGL policies commonly use
the same language and terminologies, such as the as damages language
discussed above. The term of a CGL policy that is central to any claim is
the term that triggers coverage. In CGLs and accompanying umbrella
policies, this term traditionally is the word occurrence. 8
57. See infra part IV and cases cited therein.
58. "Occurrence" is usually defined in the policy to mean: an event or accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. See
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 462 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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1. "Continuous or repeated exposure to conditions"
This term is most advantageous to an insured seeking coverage on an
environmental claim. This language encompasses the long-term, repeated
release of hazardous substances; indeed it is the language that provides for
coverage of environmental clean-up costs under pre-1970s policies
containing no pollution exclusion endorsements.
2. "Neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured"
This term is the stuff of which fact issues are made, particularly in the
context of environmental claims. However, to the benefit of the insured, the
carrier generally has the burden of proving that the occurrence was either
expected or intended by the insured, as that language is exclusionary in
nature. This is the law in Arkansas. In U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v.
Reynolds,59 the insured fired a warning shot at an intruder which ricocheted
and struck the intruder. The intruder filed suit against the insured, who then
made a claim under his homeowner's policy.6' The carrier denied coverage,
claiming that the insured's actions had the expected or intended result of
injuring the intruder. The lower court ruled that the evidence demonstrated
that the insured only meant to warn the intruder and thus did not expect or
intend to harm him.6 In the course of affirming the lower court's decision
in favor of the insured, the Court of Appeals noted that the carrier had the
burden of proof on the expected or intended issue, as the language was
exclusionary.62
A significant amount of litigation has taken place with regard to the
portion of the occurrence definition dealing with whether or not the property
damage was expected or intended by the insured. The general rule is that
coverage exists for the unintended results of an intentional act, but not for
the damages assessed because of injury which was intended to be inflicted.63
By far, the largest group of cases where insurers have prevailed on
occurrence arguments involve site operators or other active polluters.
Generally, courts have been reluctant to find coverage where pollution
occurs in the ordinary course of the insured's business or as a routine aspect
of its operations.' In a significant New Jersey decision, the court held that
59. 11 Ark. App. 141, 667 S.W.2d 664 (1984).
60. Id. at 144, 667-S.W.2d at 665.
61. Id. at 144-45, 667 S.W.2d at 665.
62. Id. at 145, 667 S.W.2d at 667.
63. Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 310 A.2d 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
64. See USF&G v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988); Millipore Corp.
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the conduct of an insured giving rise to the release of pollutants at its
manufacturing facilities was so chronic as to preclude any possibility that
the resulting pollution was not expected or intended.65
Although insurers have had a fair degree of success in establishing the
absence of any occurrence in claims involving active polluters, most courts
have been reluctant to find that waste generators expected or intended to
cause pollution where they had no direct involvement in the disposal of
waste at a site.' This is particularly true at licensed waste disposal facilities
where, unknown to the insured, the site operator was illegally dumping
waste in violation of its operation permit. 7
A crucial aspect of the occurrence issue is the extent of the insured's
knowledge about the events giving rise to the claimed liability. The
outcome of occurrence issues may also turn on whether the jurisdiction in
question measures the insured's expectation or intent based upon a subjective
standard (actual intent) or an objective standard (what would a reasonable
person have foreseen under the same circumstances).
Most courts have adopted a subjective standard for measuring whether
harm was expected or intended.68 In general, these courts are less likely to
rule out coverage on this basis unless pollution results from egregious and
chronic conditions at the insured's plant. An objective standard was upheld
under Texas law in In re: Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB Contami-
nation Insurance Coverage Litigation.69 There the court held that Texas
Eastern was not entitled to general liability coverage under policies issued
after 1972 for the cost of cleaning up PCB contamination in its nationwide
network of natural gas pipelines where its employees were aware that PCB
contamination was occurring at the time. 70 Further, .under Mississippi law,
a result cannot be an accident if it was the foreseeable result of a sequence
of events that the insured set in motion.7'
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4306 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1995).
65. Diamond Shamrock, 609 A.2d at 440.
66. See Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. USF&G, 775 F. Supp. 718 (D.
Vt. 1991).
67. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Mo. 1991), reversed on other grounds, 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992).
68. See Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir.
1992).
69. 870 F. Supp. 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moulton, 464 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 1985).
1996]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
3. The timing issue
A third issue associated with interpreting "occurrence" is timing. In a
case seeking CGL policy coverage for environmental clean-up costs, when
does the occurrence take place? This question presents a critical battle-
ground in coverage litigation: determining the applicable policy depends
squarely upon determining the time of the occurrence. In order to establish
coverage under a more liberal policy, the insured will advocate a position
supporting an earlier occurrence date, while the carrier will argue for a later
occurrence ,date to take advantage of the greater limitations of pollution
exclusion language contained in later policies.
Most courts find that the presence of pollutants in the ambient
environment fits within the definition of property damage.72 A distinction
still may be drawn between liability under CERCLA, which may be
triggered by the mere threat of a release and actual releases that might
involve property damage.73 However, where pollutants actually have been
discharged into the environment, the presence of those pollutants has been
found to constitute property damage.74
Because courts typically will find the actual release of contaminants
into the environment tantamount to physical injury to tangible property, the
issue that must be addressed is the trigger of coverage that will apply to the
claim. There are four main trigger theories which have developed in the
toxic tort context of asbestos exposure cases and other bodily injury claims.
They are:
"Exposure"--all policies during dates of actual contact with injurious
substance are triggered;
"Manifestation"--policy in effect when injury was discovered or
reasonably could have been discovered is triggered;
"Continuous Trgger"-all policies from the date of first exposure
through manifestation of injury are triggered; and
"Actual Injury"--policy in effect when injury actually occurred, even
if not discovered then, is triggered.
A review of the decisions involving the trigger of coverage reveals that
there is little consensus among the various jurisdictions in the United States
as to the most appropriate trigger for property damage claims.75 No
72. See, e.g., Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 930 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1991); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991).
73. Allstate Ins., 464 So. 2d at 509-10.
74. Hays v. Mobile Oil Corp., 930 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1991).
75. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(continuous trigger), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-
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Arkansas case law exists on the issue. The view adopted by the Eighth
Circuit in NEPACCO, albeit dictum, follows the exposure theory.76
The manifestation trigger and the actual injury trigger usually are
single-year triggers, whereas, the exposure trigger and the continuous trigger
are multi-year triggers. In general, manifestation triggers have not found
favor with the courts, particularly in cases where the dates of discharge
activity are readily identifiable. The Michigan courts and the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appear to have a stronghold on manifestation
case law." Routinely, other jurisdictions are rejecting this trigger of
coverage.7"
Rather than triggering coverage when pollution is discovered, the actual
injury trigger theory asks when the undiscovered injury resulted. When
pollution results from discrete, identifiable causes or when the causes of
contamination cease prior to the inception of an insurer's policies, courts
applying actual injury triggers limit coverage to the policy in effect when
pollutants were first released into the environment. Harm which may persist
into subsequent policy years as a result of this initial occurrence is treated
as a loss in progress, and relates back to the initial policy year. This
approach is adopted in a number of courts, including Pennsylvania, Oregon,
and New Jersey.79
The discharge of pollutants into the environment generally triggers
coverage under both an injury in fact and exposure analysis under the policy
in effect at the time of the initial release of pollutants. The expiration of
that policy does not cut off that insurer's obligation to pay damages for
pollution that continues thereafter. When pollution results from discrete
discharges that occur during multiple policy periods, courts applying an
exposure analysis have triggered multiple policies."0
O-Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (exposure trigger); Dow Chem. Co. v.
Associated Indem. Corp., 727 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (actual injury trigger);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(manifestation trigger).
76. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri v. Continental Ins. Co., 488 U.S.
821 (1988). The occurrence takes place at the time of the discharge of the materials and the
consequent damage to the property, not at the time the clean-up costs are incurred. Id. at
984.
77. See, e.g., Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
78. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995) (en
bane).
79. See Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 997 F.2d
172, 175 (6th Cir. 1993).
80. Village of Morrisville, 775 F. Supp. at 730-31.
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The decisions employing the continuous trigger of coverage basically
trigger all policies from the date of the very first exposure of a pollutant to
the environment through the manifestation of the injury and acknowledg-
ment of the problem by the potentially responsible parties. This trigger of
coverage results in a battle among the various insurance carriers over
responsibility for the polluting events. A number of courts, particularly
those in New Jersey and Delaware, continue to adhere to this concept.8"
B. "Pollution Exclusion" Clauses
Separate and apart from the general terms of the policy are the terms
specifically pertaining to pollution exclusion, meaning those provisions that
work to limit or exclude from coverage pollution-based or environmental-
based claims. In later CGL policies, these exclusions may be found in the
body of the general policy, along with other common exclusions. In earlier
CGL policies, the pollution exclusion appears as an endorsement to the
policy.
Whether contained in the general policy or in an endorsement, a
pollution exclusion provision is just that--an exclusion from coverage. This
is of prime importance to the insured from a burden-of-proof standpoint
under Arkansas law because, if the carrier contends that a particular claim
falls under an exclusion, the carrier has the burden of proof on that issue.82
Pollution exclusion clauses are evolutionary. Beginning in the mid-
1970s, limited, conditional pollution exclusion endorsements began to
appear. These types of endorsements usually limit both the amount of
coverage and the conditions under which coverage will apply. Beginning
in the mid-1980s, CGL carriers moved to absolute pollution exclusion
endorsements, in which no pollution-related loss is covered under any
circumstance.
81. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 614 A.2d 642 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992), rev'd by 678 A.2d 1152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Harleysville Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sussex County, 831 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Del. 1993).
82. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 11 Ark. App. 141, 667 S.W.2d
664 (1984).
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1. "Sudden and Accidental"
Most pollution exclusion clauses that provide limited coverage
condition such coverage on an event that was sudden and accidental.8 3 The
common question that arises in litigation over this type of clause is the
meaning of sudden and accidental. One of the commonly accepted rules of
interpretation of insurance contracts is that if the policy language is
ambiguous, the language will be construed in favor of coverage. This is the
law in Arkansas.84
The meaning of sudden and accidental has been the source of a good
deal of litigation. Some courts have ruled that the term is ambiguous, and
thus coverage applies."
Other courts have considered the sudden and accidental clause in the
context of the expected or intended language of the general policy and have
concluded that the sudden and accidental clause is ambiguous and a mere
extension of the expected or intended language contained in the policy.
Thus, when the pollution event is neither expected nor intended by the
insured, necessarily the event also is considered sudden and accidental.8 6
However, other courts have determined that the term sudden and
accidental is neither ambiguous nor an extension of the expected and
intended language.87 These courts assert the term sudden must be given
meaning in the temporal sense, requiring the event to be abrupt and
unanticipated.88  This is the view adopted by the Eighth Circuit. In Aetna
83, An example of such a clause is as follows:
In consideration for the premium charged it is agreed that the policy does not
apply to personal injury or property damage arising out of or contributed by the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course
or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.
84. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. City of Marianna, 291 Ark. 610, 616, 727 S.W.2d
375, 378 (1987); Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 268 Ark. 300, 304, 595 S.W.2d 681, 683
(1980); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Hardee, 188 Ark. 542, 548, 66 S.W.2d 648, 651 (1934).
85. See, e.g., Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520, 524-25
(N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1975); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980).
86. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1219-
20 (Ill. 1992); Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451
A.2d 990, 993-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
87. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. USF&G, 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 955 (1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392
(Mich. 1991); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374
(N.C. 1986), reh'd denied, 346 S.E.2d 134.
88. See supra note 87.
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Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.,89 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the
insured, applying the second approach discussed above.9" The Eighth
Circuit reversed.9 This is the interpretation accorded by several state courts
and by the majority of federal circuit courts of appeals.92
2. "Regulatory Estoppel"
Another challenge to both conditional and absolute pollution exclusion
clauses focuses on a new theory known as regulatory estoppel. This theory
is a significant development because it has the potential to nullify the
decisions cited above which apply the sudden and accidental language to
deny coverage. The regulatory estoppel theory is most prominently
explained in Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co.93
The thrust of the regulatory estoppel theory is that carriers should be
estopped from enforcing pollution exclusion clauses where they have
misrepresented to state insurance regulatory bodies the scope and effect of
the clauses. In Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court undertook an
exhaustive review of the state's regulatory history relating to the develop-
ment of CGL policies, including the development in the early 1970s, when
the insurance industry introduced pollution exclusion language.94 The court
concluded that when the industry sought approval of the pollution exclusion
89. 783 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
90. Id. at 1209 (finding that the term "sudden and accidental" is ambiguous and a mere
extension of the "expected or intended" language).
91. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.
1992). The court stated:
The term "sudden," we believe, "when considered in its plain and easily
understood sense .... is defined with a 'temporal element that joins together
conceptually the immediate and the unexpected."'... Indeed, assigning meaning
to both "sudden" and "accidental" eliminates any perceived ambiguity. The
district court found "sudden" to be ambiguous because it could mean abrupt or
unexpected. Because "accidental" includes the unexpected, however, "sudden"
must mean abrupt. To hold otherwise would render the word "sudden"
superfluous....
Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991); Waste
Management of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381-82 (N.C. 1986);
Transamerican Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212, 214 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
93. 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993). The Morton decision is quite lengthy and defies
condensation; accordingly, it is recommended as further reading. See E. C. Laird & E. I.
Medoway, Morton's Binding Legacy on the Pollution Exclusion-Regulatory Estoppel, 7
ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 25 (1994) (providing an excellent explanation of the regulatory estoppel
theory).
94. Morton, 629 A.2d at 843-48.
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clause from the New Jersey Department of Insurance, the industry had
misled that agency.9" Specifically, the court found that the industry had
portrayed the pollution exclusion clause as a mere clarification of pre-
existing CGL policy language.96 In fact, however--as counsel for the
carriers had argued in Morton-the true purpose of the pollution exclusion
was to deny coverage for pollution-caused damages, regardless of whether
they were expected or intended, unless the event was sudden and accidental,
"a so-called 'boom' event., 97
Moreover, the court found the above quoted sentence in the industry's
memorandum to the Department to be "simply untrue."9' The court looked
to the 1966 version of the CGL policy approved by the Department and
concluded that it encompassed gradual pollution, even when the discharge
of pollutants was intentional, so long as the ultimate loss itself was neither
expected nor intended.99 Thus, the court ruled that by virtue of their
representations, the carriers were estopped from asserting before the courts
their much broader interpretation of the clause."° Particularly noteworthy
to the court was that if the industry did in fact intend to eliminate coverage
where it had existed before, a corresponding rate reduction would have been
in order.'01
Other courts have found coverage based, in part, on state regulatory
history relating to the approval of pollution exclusion clauses. 02
95. Id. at 847-48, 851-52.
96. Id. at 851. The court quoted from a memorandum that the industry filed with the
New Jersey Department of Insurance:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases under
present policies because the damages can be said to be expected or intended and
thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence. The above [pollution] exclusion
clarifies this situation so as to avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued
for pollution or contamination-caused injuries when the pollution or contamination
results from an accident ....
Morton, 629 A.2d at 851.
97. Id. at 852.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 874.
101. Morton, 629 A.2d at 872. The court stated:
The material and substantial reduction in coverage proposed by the pollution-
exclusion clause, if disclosed to regulators in New Jersey and elsewhere,
undoubtedly would have affected adversely the industry's rates for CGL coverage.
Instead, because of the industry's failure, in its presentation to regulators, to
acknowledge and emphasize the sharp reduction in coverage, insureds in New
Jersey, and perhaps throughout the country, apparently have paid rates for CGL
policies incorporating the pollution-exclusion clause comparable to those paid for
the prior "occurrence"-based policies that afforded substantially greater coverage.
Id.
102. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1995) (en banc);
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3. Types of Pollution Excluded
Another area of litigation focuses on the specific types of pollution
excluded from coverage. This issue may arise, regardless of whether the
pollution exclusion clause is limited or absolute. The industry goes to great
lengths to encompass every conceivable type of pollution, and every
conceivable type of pollution event. 3 Nonetheless, carriers and insureds
constantly litigate whether the type of pollution or the manner in which it
occurred is encompassed by the exclusionary language."° The insured must
carefully review the terms of its own pollution exclusion to determine
whether the type of pollution or the nature of the event falls outside the
exclusion.
4. The "Owned Property" Exclusion
The owned property exclusion is typically used as an affirmative
defense in situations where a manufacturer or other entity has been found
to have polluted the environment in and around its manufacturing facility.
Under this affirmative defense, insurers assert that the policy does not
provide coverage to property owned or leased by the named insured.
Although there was some early success by the insurance companies in
asserting this exclusion as a defense to coverage, by and large, the owned
property exclusion has not been an effective bar to coverage. Primarily,
courts have found that when there is evidence that groundwater has been
contaminated, there is property damage to property not owned or occupied
by the insured." 5 This proposition applies with even greater force in states
that follow the reasonable use doctrine and hold that one's use of subterra-
nean waters are qualified.0 6
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay by no means covers the entire waterfront of issues relating
to insurance coverage for environmental claims. Beyond this, in light of the
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989); Joy Technologies v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456
N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
103. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
104. The numerous cases on this type of issue defy categorization.
105. See United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983).
106. Arkansas is one such jurisdiction, see Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark.
76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957).
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continued, vigorous litigation on the subject, it is likely that new issues and
trends may develop. From the perspective of Arkansas practitioners in the
field, perhaps the future will hold decisions from the Supreme Court of
Arkansas or Arkansas Court of Appeals on the as damages and sudden and
accidental issues, as well as the regulatory estoppel. theory.

